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ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED
CHILD: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE SPERM DONOR
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Gayle Burns became pregnant through artificial
insemination using the preserved sperm of her husband, who died
from cancer two years earlier. 1 In his contractual agreement with the
reproductive clinic, Michael Burns indicated his intent to prevent
destruction of his sperm in the event of his death, his consent to
assisted reproduction, and his desire to give his wife legal rights to
his sperm upon his death. 2 Gayle acknowledged their discussion
about having children and her husband's hope for her to conceive his
child upon his death; he had even purchased a life insurance policy to
provide for Gayle and their child. 3
Despite Michael's proactive efforts to make known his intent to
father a child posthumously, Gayle was initially denied social
security benefits when she applied on behalf of their son. 4 The
decision was subsequently reversed, but then reversed again based on
Utah's prohibition of payments to posthumously conceived children
(PCC).5 Although Utah law requires the sperm donor to record his
intent to "'parent' a child conceived through assisted reproduction ...
in order to later be legally" recognized as the father, Michael's intent
has thus far been ignored. 6 If the completed consent form and
purchase of a life-insurance policy for the benefit of his future child
were insufficient to declare Michael Burns' intent to parent and
financially support the posthumously conceived child, it is difficult to
imagine what additional hurdles might be imposed upon the donor
during his lifetime to ensure his intent is carried out and the
posthumously conceived child's inheritance rights are protected. 7
Gayle Burns may have avoided the extensive litigation she has
undertaken to secure benefits for her son if Utah's statute allowed the

1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Jennifer Dobner, Utah High Court to Hear Posthumous Benefits Case, DESERET NEWS
(Feb. 7, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.deseretnews.comlarticleI700222993IUtah-highcourt-to-hear-posthumous-benefits-case.html.
[d.
/d.
Id.
[d.
[d.
See id.
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decedent's intent to govern in particular circumstances, thereby
protecting the class of PCC born to donors who complied with the
requisite statutory formalities. 8 A signed, written, and witnessed
consent form that could not be contested without liability for legal
fees and court-mandated acceptance would eliminate the need to rely
on oral testimony from the family as to the decedent's intent. 9
Further, when a donor engages in estate planning during his lifetime
for the purpose of financially providing for the after-born, whether a
source of funds exists for the child's inheritance will be ascertainable
at the donor's death, and such planning will reinforce his intent for
the posthumous conception to occur, as indicated by the consent
form. 10
Cryopreservation and assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are
often utilized by young, childless couples who are drained by their
medical expenses and fail to engage in estate planning, II thereby
amplifying the need for a statute that identifies the inheritance rights
of these PCC and informs the donors of the requisite steps they must
take to ensure their intent is carried OUt. 12 However, even if there are
no assets in the decedent's estate to which the child could bring a
claim, a consent form stipulating the donor's intent would be relevant
to determine whether the after-born child may inherit through the
estates of the decedent's relatives, or as a class member in their estate
plans. 13
Under the Social Security Act and the Supreme Court's Capato
decision, PCC are only entitled to receive social security survivor
benefits if the after-born heirs are eligible to inherit under the
intestacy laws of the state where the wage earner was domiciled. 14 In
light of this need for an unambiguous declaration of PCC's
8.
9.

10.
11.

12.

13.
14.

See id.; infra Part IV.A.
See Dobner, supra note 1; cf MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 17-104 (LexisNexis
2011) (imposing a court order and sanctions on any person who refuses to accept an
acknowledged, statutory power of attorney).
See infra Part IV.E.
See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
Many couples resort to these techniques due to the diagnosis of a serious illness or the
need for a treatment that can cause infertility. Dlv. OF REPROD. HEALTH, NAT'L CTR.
FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, 2009 AsSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: SUCCESS RATES, NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY
CLINIC REpORTS 34 (2011).
E.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). State
intestacy statutes govern the disposition of an individual's probate property when the
decedent dies without a will. ANGELA M. VALLARIO, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ESTATE
PLANNING 5 (2012); see also EST. & TRUSTS §§ 3-101 to 3-105.
In re Estate ofKolacy, 753 A.2d at 1260.
See infra notes 75-80, 86-90 and accompanying text.
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inheritance rights under state law, the increasing use of reproductive
technology and incidence of PCC,15 and the extensive litigation
spotlighting PCC and their right to insurance benefits,16 Maryland's
General Assembly repealed and reenacted Maryland's after-born
heirs statute in 2012.17 The amended law confers inheritance rights
upon PCC born within two years of the decedent's death if the donor
provided written consent for the posthumous conception to occur and
written consent to be the parent of the posthumously conceived
child. IS While there has been no litigation in Maryland to date by
PCC seeking an award of insurance benefits, the amended statute
should allow PCC to recover social security survivor benefits if the
donor provided the requisite consent and the child is born within the
statute of limitations period, as these PCC would be eligible to inherit
under Maryland's intestacy law. 19 Yet despite this attempt to stem
the uncertainty as to whether PCC are entitled to social security
funds, the law fails to adequately protect the inheritance ric;hts of
PCC, and may likewise fail to secure their insurance benefits. 2
This comment aims to illustrate why Maryland's intestacy statute is
unsatisfactory and should be amended again to enumerate the
circumstances under which PCC, conceived from banked sperm after
the father's death, may inherit through their deceased father's estate. 21
The proposed statute would apply only when a decedent dies intestate
or a testator bequeaths property to "my children;,,22 however, the
statute would not be implicated when a testator names his spouse as
the sole legatee of his estate plan. 23 Part II discusses the reproductive
technology that has allowed children to be born years after the
father's death, developments in Maryland and federal law related to
the inheritance rights of PCC, and the inadequacy of Maryland's
current after-born heirs statute. Part III explains why PCC should
only be entitled to inherit from the deceased parent's estate in limited

15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002); see
discussion infra Part II.A.
See discussion infra Part n.c.
EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107; H.B. 101, 430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2012 Md. Laws
4330-33. The previous law only allowed children conceived prior to the decedent's
death to inherit from the estate, even if bom after that parent's death. See discussion
infra Part II.B.1.
EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107.
See infra Part II.B.2; notes 80, 86-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 60-69, 91-96 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Parts n.B.3, IV.A.
See infra note 102.
See discussion infra Part IV.E.
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circumstances, considering the interests of others affected by these
new heirs. Part IV proposes a solution whereby Maryland donors
would complete a consent form at the time of the donation, creating a
signed, written, and witnessed record that expresses the intent for the
posthumous reproduction to occur and the desire to financially
provide for the child. While the proposed statute would maintain a
presumption against inheritance rights for PCC, the donor may rebut
this presumption by complying with these statutory formalities during
his lifetime to unequivocally indicate his intent. 24 Lastly, in order to
secure inheritance rights for his after-born child and a timely
resolution of his estate, the proposed statute would require the donor
to engage in estate planning during his lifetime to ensure a source of
funds for the child's inheritance. 25 For example, the creation of an
inter vivos or testamentary trust for the benefit of the donor's wife
during her lifetime and then to his children would satisfy this final
statutory requirement. 26 Such clearly manifested intent could hardly
be contested. 27
II.

ALTHOUGH MARYLAND LAW ADDRESSES THE
INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF AFTER-BORN HEIRS, THE
PREVALENCE OF NON-TRADITIONAL METHODS OF
CONCEPTION AND THE NEED TO PROTECT THESE PCC
REQUIRES AN ADDITIONAL AMENDMENT OF
MARYLAND'S STATUTE

A.

Due to Developments in the Field ofReproductive Technology,
Conception is Increasingly Occurring via Non- Traditional
Methods and Years After One Parent's Death

In anticipation of Warren Woodward's leukemia treatment, he and
his wife arranged to bank his sperm. 28 Two years after Warren's
death, Lauren Woodward gave birth to twin girls who were
"conceived through artificial insemination using the. . . preserved
semen."29 Recognizing the potential for posthumous reproduction to
occur under a "variety of conditions" and "implicate other fmnly
established State and individual interests," the court rejected the idea

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part IV.E.
See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002).
Id.
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of using any bright-line rule to determine the inheritance rights of
pee, absent a legislative directive. 30
Homologous inseminations raise concerns different than those
presented by heterologous inseminations/ 1 but that likewise should
be addressed through written agreements. 32 When children are born
to the surviving parent or partner from the decedent's stored semen
specimens, the issue becomes whether pee may inherit from the
deceased father's estate. 33 However, a simple, bright-line rule that
grants the child a right to the money raises practical concerns that
would make such a solution administratively impracticable. 34
With scientific advancements that preserve the viability of sperm
and eggs years after their collection, Maryland must implement
further amendments to its 2012 legislative framework that keep pace
with this rapidly developing field in order to reduce uncertainty about
the legal rights of pee. 35 Various techniques manipulate the eggs,

30.
31.

Id. at 262.
See Jacqueline Mroz, From One Sperm Donor, 150 Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2011, at D1. Heterologous insemination refers to insemination by an anonymous
donor. Lucy R. Dollens, Note, Artificial Insemination: Right of Privacy and the
Difficulty in Maintaining Donor Anonymity, 35 IND. L. REv. 213, 214 (2001). With
recent heterologous inseminations, sperm specimens from a single donor can yield
more than 150 offspring. Mroz, supra. While anonymous donors routinely sign
written waivers with the sperm bank to preclude paternity claims by the children born
from the banked sperm, Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 848 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993), "unintended consanguinity" can create problems for offspring who are
unknowingly related to one another but live nearby, potentially dating and engaging in
accidental incest. Mroz, supra, at D6. Some sperm banks address this problem by
limiting the number of births or units sold originating from a single donor and
monitoring the geographic distribution of the children born from each donor. See,
e.g., Limitations on Donor Births, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, http://fairfaxcryobank.coml
ReadFirst.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).

32.

33.

34.

35.

See, e.g., Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement,
CRYOGENIC LABORATORIES, http://www.cryolab.comlforms.shtml (last visited Sept. 5,
2012). Maryland's current after-born heirs law targets homologous inseminations, to
the exclusion of heterologous inseminations. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 3-107
(LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the
Sperm: The Law ofPost-Mortem Insemination, I lL. & HEALTH 229, 244 (1985-87).
See discussion infra Part 1I1.A. For example, how long should the estate remain open
for? See infra text accompanying notes 93-96. What amount of assets should be
reserved for the inheritance? See infra Part lIlA. How can a sufficient inheritance be
sheltered for additional PCC born in the future? See infra Part 1I1.A. How can the
inheritance of any children born during the decedent's lifetime be preserved and
protected? See infra Part 1I1.A.
Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 33, at 233.
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spenn, or both in order to increase fertility rates. 36 Still considered
experimental because of its low success rate, oocyte cryopreservation
is the freezing of a woman's eggs prior to fertilization. 37 Because
only about 900 babies have been born to date from frozen eggs,
whereas hundreds of thousands have been born from frozen spenn,
this comment focuses on the ramifications of children posthumously
conceived from banked sperm. 38
Cryopreservation of sperm involves freezing the specimens at
temperatures nearly minus 200 degrees Celsius and storing them in
liquid nitrogen, sometimes for many years.39 These non-traditional
methods are used when medical treatment or disease, environmental
toxins, or a pre-existing medical condition threatens the quality or
production of the spenn and thereby creates a risk of reduced fertility
or sterility.40

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Biotech Child
of the 21" Century, 43 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. LJ. 393, 395 (2008). Whereas only the
sperm is handled in artificial insemination, ART involves the surgical removal of a
woman's eggs from her ovaries. What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, I, http://www.cdc.gov/ART (last
updated Aug. 1,2012).
Oocyte Storage (Egg Freezing), FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, http://www.fairfax
cryobank.comiOocyteStorage.shtml (last visited Dec. 11, 2012); Egg Freezing for
Medical Indications, NYU LANGONE MEDICAL CENTER, NYU FERTILITY CENTER,
http://www.nyufertilitycenter.orglegg_freezinglmedical (last visited Dec. 11,2012).
Egg Freezing for Medical Indications, supra note 37; Cyropreservation Information
Brochure, PITTSBURGH CRYOBANK,
1, http://www.pittsburghcryobank.coml
cryoinfo.pdf(last updated Feb. 28, 2003).
Sperm Banking, Keeping Hopes Alive, CRYOGENIC LABORATORIES, http://
www.cryolab.comlpdflCLI%20Sperm%20Banking%20Brochure.pdf (last visited
Dec. 11, 2012). Some scientists discovered the ability to preserve sperm stem cells
for more than a century. Amy L. Komoroski, Comment, After Woodward v.
Commissioner of Social Services: Where do Posthumously Conceived Children Stand
in the Line ofDescent?, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 297 (2002).
Sperm Banking, Keeping Hopes Alive, supra note 39. Cryopreservation is commonly
used by men who receive a diagnosis of testicular or prostate cancer, work in an
occupation that exposes them to harmful chemicals or pollutants, desire insurance
prior to undergoing a vasectomy, or suffer from oligozoospermia, a condition
characterized by a low sperm count or sperm of poor quality. Id. If a man suffers
from oligozoospermia, "banking consecutive specimens of semen" creates a
concentrated deposit and ensures availability for use at critical times during the
reproductive process. Homologous Artificial Insemination, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 154, 155
(1978). Oocyte cryopreservation is used for similar reasons, or by women who want
to conceive at a later time but wish to preserve their eggs during their reproductive
prime. Oocyte Cyropreservation Program and Success Rates, NYU LANGONE
MEDICAL CENTER, NYU FERTILITY CENTER, http://www.nyufertilitycenter.orgl
egg_freezinglsuccess_rates (last visited Dec. 11,2012).
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Because frozen sperm can be preserved for at least ten years,41
Maryland's intestacy statute outlining the disposition of property
must establish a more comprehensive framework to reconcile the
competing interests of an efficient estate administration process and
the protection of the inheritance rights of these PCC, who effectively
are not recognized as descendants of the donor for inheritance
purposes unless the donor complied with the statutory consent
requirements and the children were born within two years of the
decedent's death.42

B.

Despite Efforts to Expand the Legal Rights o/PCC, Maryland's
After-Born Heirs Law Remains Inadequate

1.

Maryland Previously Restricted Inheritance Rights to Children
Conceived During the Decedent's Lifetime

Prior to its amendment in 2012, Maryland's after-born heirs statute
allowed a child conceived during the decedent's lifetime-even if the
child was born subsequent to the decedent's death-to inherit from
that parent's estate. 43 However, this law precluded the growing class
of PCC from inheriting from the deceased parent's estate, thereby
preventing these after-born heirs from attaining legal status equal to
those children conceived during both parents' lifetimes. 44
2. Current Law Expands the Inheritance Rights ofPCC
The enactment of House Bill 101, effective October 1, 2012,
expands the potential for PCC to inherit through the decedent. 45 First,
Maryland revised the definition of a child to include PCC of
decedents who consented in writing for the posthumous conception to
occur, in accordance with the requirements of section 20-111, and
41.
42.

43.

44.

45.

Jamie Rowsell, Stayin' Alive: Postmortem Reproduction and Inheritance Rights, 41
FAM. CT. REv. 400,401 (2003).
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 2-111 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); see also discussion infra Parts
III.A., IV.A.
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis 2011) (amended 2012).
See id. In 2009, the number of children who were born and conceived using ART
nearly doubled from those born in 2000. NAT'L eTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE
PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, supra note 11, at 65.
EST. & TRUSTS §§ 1-205(a)(2), 3-107. The new law affects three Maryland statutes,
amending sections 1-205 (defining who constitutes a child) and 3-107 (providing
which PCC are entitled to inherit under state intestacy law), and adding section 20111 (describing the consent formalities). H.B. 101, 430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.,
2012 Md. Laws 4330-32.
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provided written consent to be the parent of the posthumously
46
conceived child. Maryland also overhauled its after-born heirs law.
The amended statute retains the provision allowing a child conceived
during the decedent's lifetime, but born subsequent to that parent's
death, to inherit from that estate. 47 Moreover, PCC are entitled to
inherit as children under the state's intestacy laws if: (1) the donor
consented to the use of his genetic material towards posthumous
conception in a writing signed by the donor, or signed by another
person in the donor's presence and at his express direction, on or
after October 1, 2012; (2) the donor provided written consent to be
the parent of the posthumously conceived child; and (3) the child is
born within two years of the decedent's death.48
3.

Despite Increased Recognition ofPCC and Their Inheritance
Rights, Maryland's Statutes are Unsatisfactory

While the legislation signifies awareness of the need to clarify the
law,49 shortcomings in the statutes create the potential for litigation. 50
First, the statutory formalities are inadequate. 51 Without requiring the
donor-or other person signing in his presence and at his directionto create the writing before a notary public or other witnesses, the law
causes concern of fraud and forgery. 52 Second, while the previous
law required revision because it indiscriminately foreclosed an
increasing number of children from receiving inheritance benefits, 53
the temporal restriction in the current law will likely have the same
effect, since only children born within two years of the decedent's
death will be entitled to inherit. 54 In fact, stipulating a two-year
period risks delaying administration of the estate, thus conflicting
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

EST. & TRUSTS

§§ 1-205(a)(2), 20-1 11 (b), (c).
§ 3-107(a).
Id. §§ 3-107(b), 20-1 11 (c). The law prohibits a person from using a known donor's
sperm for the purpose of assisted reproduction after the donor's death without the
donor's prior written and signed consent. Id. §§ 20-1 11(bHc). Individuals who use
the genetic material of a donor who they know died and did not consent to the
posthumous use of his sperm are guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine. Id. §§
20-1 11 (b), (d).
H.B. 101, 430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2012 Md. Laws 4430-42.
See infra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
See EsT. & TRUSTS §§ 3-107(b)(l), 20-1 11 (c); infra note 47 and accompanying text.
A previous version of the House Bill required the donor's written consent to be
acknowledged before a notary public, but this provision was stricken. H.B. 101,
430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012) (as introduced to the Comm. on Health
and Gov't Operations, Jan. 19,2012).
See EsT. & TRUSTS §§ 3-107 (b)(l), 20-111(c); infra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b).
EST. & TRUSTS
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with the goal of a simple probate process. 55 A personal representative
who postpones distributing the estate pending the two-year period to
ensure no PCC are born compromises this desired efficiency. 56
Alternatively, a personal representative who distributed assets prior
to the enactment of the law could be deemed to have done so
inappropriately if a child is born within two years after the decedent's
death.57
Several inconsistencies in the statutes will foster uncertainty about
the inheritance rights of PCC. While the law mandates that the
donor's consent for the posthumous use of his sperm be in
accordance with the requirements of section 20-111, these same
formalities are not imposed upon the donor's written consent to be
the parent of the child. 58 Moreover, though the law will not apply
retroactively,s9 it nonetheless has the potential to affect trusts already
in existence. By declining to acknowledge the validity of consent
given prior to October 1, 2012, even donors who complied with the
statutory consent requirements during their lifetime may not have
their intent honored. 60 However, the law fails to likewise condition
its application to estates and trusts created on or after October 1,
2012, possibly impacting those created prior to this date. 61
Yet the most litigious aspect is the inconsistency between the
statute of limitations provision in the after-born heirs statute and the
absence of such a limitations period in the section pertaining to these
after-born heirs in the "Definition of Child" statute. 62 While the
former imposes a two-year statute of limitations period, during which
time the child must be born in order to inherit through the deceased
parent's estate, the latter fails to incorporate this same two-year
requirement. 63 For example, a posthumously conceived child born
55.
56.
57.

58.

59.
60.
61.
62.

63.

§ 1-105; see also infra Part III.A.
See EST. & TRUSTS § 1-105; infra Part lILA.
See EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b)(3); see also EST. & TRUSTS § IO-103(b)(l) (allowing an
individual to recover for the improper distribution of property).
See EST. & TRUSTS §§ 3-107(b), 20-11I(c). Section 20-lll(c) requires that the
consent be in writing and signed by the donor, or signed by another person in the
donor's presence and at his express direction. Id. § 20-III(c).
See id. §§ 3-107(b), 20-11 I (c) (providing that consent given on or after October I,
2012, will be held valid if the statutory formalities are satisfied).
See id.
See id.
Compare id. § 3-107(b)(3) (requiring after-born heirs to be born within two years of
the decedent's death to be eligible to inherit), with id. § 1-205(a)(2) (failing to provide
a statute of limitations in defining which PCC will be considered a child within the
meaning of the statute).
/d. §§ 1-205(a)(2), 3-107(b)(3).
EST. & TRUSTS
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three years after the decedent's death would be barred from
inheritance benefits under section 3-1D7(b), but could be determined
to be a child within the meaning of section 1-205(a)(2), where there
is no operative statute of limitations. 64 Because the Social Security
Act looks to state intestacy law in determining "who is a 'child '" and
thus entitled to survivor benefits,65 reliance on section 1-205(a)(2)
could yield the conclusion that the child is entitled to social security
benefits, notwithstanding the conflicting after-born heirs statute,
which would deem that same child ineligible to inherit from the
decedent's probate estate. 66 Because it is unclear which statute will
control in determining whether pee are eligible for social security
benefits,67 both statutes should have parallel language and consistent
requirements to avoid ambiguities.

c.

PCC are Only Entitled to Social Security Survivor Benefits
Where State Intestacy Law Confers Inheritance Rights upon
These Children

To date, the issue of inheritance rights for pee has arisen in the
context of social security benefit claims. 68 In these cases, the benefits
derive from assets already set aside as a function of the wage earner's
lifetime contributions into the social security system. 69 Thus, the
funds are transferred outside of the probate process according to
operation oflaw. 70 pee inheriting from the decedent's probate estate
present a distinguishable situation: any assets titled solely in the
donor's name are probate assets that will be subject to the estate
administration process and will pass according to the terms of his
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

70.

See id.
Astrue v. Capato ex reI. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021,2026,2032 (2012).
See EsT. & TRUSTS §§ 1-205(a)(2), 3-107(b).
See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2032-33.
See. e.g., Beeler v. Astrue,651 F.3d 954, 956-57 (8th Cir. 2011); Schafer v. Astrue,
641 F.3d 49,51 (4th Cir. 2011); Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257,
260-61 (Mass. 2002).
Survivors Planner: How Much Would Your Survivors Receive? Soc. SECURITY,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/survivorplanlonyourown5.htm (last modified Apr. 24,
2012); see also cases cited supra note 68.
See VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 18, 69; Survivors Planner: How Much Would
Your
Survivors Receive?, supra note 69; Survivors Planner: How You Apply for Survivors
Benefits,
Soc.
SECURITY,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/survivorplanl
howtoapply.htm#ht=1 (last modified Mar. 30, 2012) (explaining that the Social
Security Administration handles survivor benefits claims).
Other nonprobate
arrangements include trusts, life insurance, retirement accounts, and joint bank
accounts. VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 18. Title to these assets "passes automatically
by contract, by operation of law, or by inter vivos transfer outside the probate
administration process." ld.
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will; if the donor dies intestate, the probate assets are distributed
pursuant to the state's intestacy laws. 7l However, if the donor creates
a trust for the benefit of his after-born child, any funds allocated to
the trust would constitute nonprobate assets that would pass
according to the terms of the instrument. 72
Until recently, jurisdictions were split as to whether PCC were
entitled to inherit from the deceased parent in the context of social
security benefits. 73 The divergence of opinion stemmed from
whether an after-born child is a "child" within the meaning of the
Social Security Act and therefore entitled to survivor benefits. 74 An
internal manual for employees contains an explicit provision
pertaining to children conceived after the wage earner's death.75 The
section states that "[ a] child conceived by artificial means"
posthumously cannot inherit, unless "he or she has inheritance rights
under applicable State intestacy law.,,76 The variance amongst
circuits was due to the Social Security Administration's deference to
each state's intestacy statutes in determining who constitutes a
"child" within the meaning of the statutory language. 77 Thus, a
posthumously conceived child is only an eligible applicant for social

71.
72.
73.

74.

75.

76.
77.

VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 69.
See id.
See cases cited supra note 68. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to ultimately
decide the issue. Capato ex rei. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626,627,
632 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rei. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct.
576 (2011) (No. 11-159), rev'd 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
42 U.S.c. §§ 402(d), 416(e) (2006). The Ninth Circuit held that posthumously
conceived twins were entitled to social security benefits, construing both the Act and
the meaning of "dependency" liberally. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371F.3d 593,
598-99 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rei. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021
(2012). There, the Court acknowledged that although Arizona law lacks a statute
specifically applicable to PCC, all children are the legitimate children of their natural
parents. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599. In Estate of Kolacy, the court also
acknowledged the void in New Jersey's laws concerning posthumous conception,
ultimately deciding that the after-born twins were legal heirs under the intestacy laws.
In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1263-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
Extrapolating the legislative intent for children to inherit from and through their
parents, and the decedent's intent for his wife to bear his children, the court also
adopted a liberal reading of the legislative posture. Id. at 1262, 1264.
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM: SECTION GN
00306.001C(C)(I) DETERMINING STATUS AS A CHILD (Oct. 21, 2008), available at
https://secure.ssa.gov/appsl0/poms.nsfllnxl0200306001.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A).
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security benefits if the child would be an heir under the intestacy laws
in the state where the insured wage earner was domiciled at death. 78
Maryland courts have yet to weigh in on PCC's entitlement to
social security survivor benefits. However, the Fourth Circuit held in
Schafer v. Astrue that the posthumously conceived child was not
entitled to social security survivor benefits because the child was not
an heir under Virginia's intestacy law. 79 This court and other courts
denying benefits to after-born children have applied Chevron
deference-allowing
a
government
agency's
reasonable
interpretation of a statute it administers to prevail when the statute is
ambiguous or silent on an issue8°-to uphold the Social Security
Administration's interpretation of the statute, despite acknowledging
a range of feasible interpretations or even more reasonable ones. 81
Notwithstanding the recent amendments to Maryland's laws,82 the
remaining states comprising the Fourth Circuit preclude PCC from
inheriting under state intestacy law unless conceived during the
decedent's lifetime. 83
On May 21, 2012, the Supreme Court denied Robert Capato's
posthumously conceived twins from inheriting social security
survivor benefits. 84 In reversing the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, the Court afforded Chevron deference to the Social Security
Administration's interpretation of the Social Security Act and held
that the PCC are only entitled to social security survivor benefits if
78.
79.

80.
81.

82.
83.

84.

!d.
Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 2011). Virginia intestacy law was
determinative because the decedent was domiciled there at the time of his death. Id.
at 51-52.
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984).
See, e.g., Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954,959 (8th Cir. 2011); Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54.
A logical interpretation of the word "child" could include any biological children,
including those only born after a parent's death due to unfortunate circumstances.
Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54.
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
In Virginia, only children conceived before the decedent's death are entitled to inherit.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-8.1 (2007). Although children born from assisted conception
after the decedent's death may inherit if determined to be a relative of the decedent,
the statute is silent as to whether these offspring must be conceived prior to the
decedent's death. Id. West Virginia requires the child be conceived during the
decedent's lifetime in order to inherit from the decedent's estate. W. VA. CODE § 421-8 (2010). North and South Carolina both allow the decedent's issue to inherit if
born within ten months of the death. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-2-108 (2007).
See Astrue v. Capato ex rei. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2023, 2026 (2012). It is
undisputed that these children are the biological children of the decedent. Brief in
Opposition at 5, Capato ex rei. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012)
(No. 11-159).
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they are eligible to inherit under state intestacy law. 85 Since states
vary in their treatment of after-born heirs, whether PCC are entitled
to survivor benefits will ultimately hinge upon the law of the state
where the decedent was domiciled. 86 Because Florida's after-born
heirs statute limits inheritance rights to children conceived during the
decedent's lifetime,87 Capato's posthumously conceived twins, born
eighteen months after his death, were barred from receiving
benefits. 88
In light of Capalo, Maryland's amended intestacy scheme has a
two-fold effect. 89
First, a posthumously conceived child is
recognized as a "child" under Maryland law if the donor complied
with the statutory consent requirements, without regard to when the
child is born relative to the decedent's death.90 Next, PCC are
prohibited from inheriting as heirs of the decedent's estate, unless the
donor complied with the statutory consent requirements and the child
is born within two years of the donor's death. 91 Because state
intestacy law governs in determining if a posthumously conceived
child is entitled to social security benefits,92 whether the after-born
heirs law or the definition of a child controls may result in different
outcomes. 93 However, after-born heirs will only have inheritance
rights to the decedent's estate if their surviving parent conceives
quickly enough to provide the child with statutory protection. 94

85.

86.

87.
88.
89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.

See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033-34. The Court reasoned that the primary purpose of
the Social Security Act is to protect those relatives who were dependent upon the
wage earner during his lifetime, and moreover, Congress could not have anticipated
the current reproductive technology when the Act was originally enacted or amended,
in 1939 and 1965, respectively. Id. at 2026.
See id. at 2032; compare CAL. PROB.CODE § 249.5 (West Supp. 2012) (allowing PCC .
to inherit if the decedent and the individual designated to control the genetic material
comply with statutory formalities), with sources cited supra note 83 (providing state
intestacy statutes that deny inheritance rights to PCC).
FLA. STAT. § 732.106 (West 2010).
Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2025-26.
See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 1-205,3-107 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
See EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-205(a)(2) (failing to provide a statute of limitations in
stipulating which PCC are included in the definition of a child); Capato, 132 S. Ct. at
2032. Social security benefits are conferred to an individual recognized as a "child"
under the state's intestacy law. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d), 416(h)(2)(A) (2006); see also
supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
EST. & TRUSTS §§ 3-107(b), 20-111.
See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033.
See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
See EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b).
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III. TO ADVANCE THE LEGISLATIVE GOAL OF
STREAMLINING THE ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
PROCESS AND EFFECTUATING THE DECEDENT'S
INTENT, PCC SHOULD ONLY BE ENTITLED TO INHERIT
FROM THE DECEASED PARENT'S ESTATE UNDER
LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES

A.

Establishing a Bright-Line Rule Granting Inheritance Rights to
All PCC Would Frustrate the Probate Goals ofAdministrative
Convenience and Affect the Inheritance of Other Beneficiaries or
Heirs Entitled to Take Under Will or Intestacy

Allowing PCC to claim an inheritance from the deceased parent's
estate creates a myriad of dilemmas for legislators, families, and
estate planners. 95 In rejecting a bright-line approach either granting
or denying inheritance rights for all PCC, the Woodward court
attempted to balance these interests. 96 The court identified the state
concerns as protecting the child's interests, preserving the
reproductive rights of the deceased genetic parent, and efficiently
administering the estate, including "preventing fraudulent claims
against the estate. ,,97
In fact, a bright-line rule that grants inheritance rights to all PCC
would protract the estate administration process, since multiple
children could be conceived many years after the decedent's death. 98
The potential for several births generates greater uncertainty: the
personal representative cannot predict what amount of the decedent's
assets should be reserved for the unborn and unascertained heirs, and
this in tum would delay the distribution of any nonspecific bequests
to the known heirs.99 Moreover, the estate would need to remain
open for an indefinite period until each child is born and capable of

95.

96.

97.
98.

99.

DEP'T OF HEALTH & Soc. SEC., REpORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN
FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, 1984, ClIUld. 9314, at 4-7, 55 (U.K.). Thepurpose
of the report was to consider ethical issues arising in the field and to present potential
legislation. Id. at 1, 55.
Woodward v. Cornm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 262,264-65 (Mass. 2002).
Id. at 264-66.
In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.I. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7-401 (LexisNexis 2011). A specific bequest is
a testamentary transfer of a particular item and is most protected if there are
insufficient assets at the testator's death to implement all provisions of the will. See
EST. & TRUSTS § 9-103(b)(7); VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 88-89.
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inheriting. loo Failing to wrap up the estate within a certain time frame
would frustrate the legislative intent and the goals of the probate
laws, which seek to provide an efficient, prompt administrative
process and to minimize estate expenses. 101
A statute mandating that PCC receive a fixed dollar amount or
percentage, either based on the value of the probate estate or based on
an elaborate framework accounting for both probate and nonprobate
assets, would provide an unworkable solution. 102 The personal
representative would still be confronted with the uncertainties of the
number of PCC that could eventually be born and the amount to
reserve for their inheritances. 103 If the surviving parent chooses to
conceive five years after her husband's death, or has difficulty
becoming pregnant immediately, the administration of the decedent's
estate would be stalled and other heirs would be unable to claim their
shares. 104 Alternatively, if a child were born several years after the
estate has been settled, the statute oflimitations would make it nearly
impossible to reclaim assets that have already been distributed. l05
Furthermore, if the mother opts to have multiple children from the
cryopreserved specimens, the estate would need to remain open until
all PCC are born so each could be assured an inheritance. \06 Only
after all after-born children come into being could the estate be
distributed and settled.107 . Finally, because intestacy laws only
become relevant when a person dies without a will-or with a will
that is invalid or incomplete-there will be uncertainty as to whether
the decedent intended the after-born child to be born or to inherit
from his estate and hold equal status to those children born during his
lifetime. 108 This inability to predict the decedent's intent could
prompt claims and delay the estate administration process by
100. See In re Estate of Koiacy, 753A.2d at 1262. This scenario would apply if the
decedent dies intestate or if the testator named his children as legatees with a class
designation, such as "my children." See VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 82.
101. See EST. & TRUSTS §§ I-lOS, 7-101, 10-103; Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266. For
example, keeping the estate open indefinitely would increase expenses by prolonging
the period for which commissions are paid to the executor or corporate trustee of a
trust, ultimately reducing the inheritance of the heirs.
102. But cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2010); EST. & TRUSTS §§ 3-102 to 103
(providing the method for apportioning the decedent's estate to the surviving spouse
and issue).
103. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
104. See EsT. & TRUSTS § 7-101; Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 268.
105. EST. & TRUSTS § 10-103.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
108. EST. & TRUSTS § 3-101.
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involving extrinsic evidence to shed light on the decedent's intent. I09
Gayle Bums' attempt to secure benefits for her son exemplifies this
process, as the oral record consisting of the decedent's conversations
with his wife and family about wanting to become a father will be of
paramount importance in establishing his intent. 11O
B.

A Donor May Use a Consent Form That Complies with the
Statutory Formalities to Give Disposition Instructions for His
Stored Semen Specimens

The Food and Drug Administration regulates the donation of
human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products, and
sperm banks must comply with particular registration, recordkeeping,
and donor screening requirements. II I However, s8erm bank consent
forms are not uniform and vary in their language. 1
If the donor indicates his intent for the disposition of the sperm
specimens upon his death, the bequest should be carried out as long
as he complied with the statutory requirements of a signed, witnessed
writing. 113 The formalities encompassed in a consent form would be
akin to those required for a valid will and would allow the donor to
express his intent at the time of the sperm donation. 114 Because of the
presumption against inheritance rights for PCC, a donor who fails to
comply with these formalities or indicates that the stored specimens
be destroyed upon his death would simply waive the child's right to
inherit through his estate. 115
Yet in order for a bequest of banked sperm to be found valid, such
specimens must be bequeathable. 1I6 The property dimension of
sperm specimens was considered but dismissed by a French court in
one of the first cases involving post-mortem insemination.117 There,
the family of a French citizen brought a breach of contract claim
against a sperm bank that refused to deliver the banked specimens to
the decedent's widow. liS Acknowledging that the arcane laws did not
contemplate modem methods of reproduction, the court nonetheless
declined to accept the plaintiffs' contention that the specimens were a

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269-70.
Dobner, supra note 1.
21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.1-3, 127.55 (2012).
See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See EST. & TRUSTS § 4-102; see infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
See infra text accompanying notes 117-18, 121-23.
Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 33, at 229-32.
[d. at 229-30.
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bailed, material good that must be returned to the bailor's heir upon
the bailor's death. 1l9 Refusing to qualify the spenn specimens as
inheritable property or to consider property rights, the court held that
the decedent's intent should be the deciding factor, citing the special
relationship between spenn and the individual's fundamental right to
choose to conceive. 120
Almost ten years after the French court refused to consider that
property rights should affect the disposition of banked semen
specimens upon their donor's death, a California court established
that such specimens are in fact "a unique type of 'property'" and
bequeathable. 121 In Hecht v. Kane, the Court held that although not
joined to an egg at the time, the deceased donor's banked semen
specimens constituted "property," due to their potential to create
life. 122
The case was distinguishable from Moore v. Regents of University
of California, in which Moore was unsuccessful in his conversion
claim when the physician performing Moore's leukemia treatment
used his excised cells for medical research without Moore's
permission. 123 The Moore court decided that the patient failed to
retain a sufficient ownership interest in the cells or to maintain an
expectation of possession of the cells after their removal to warrant a
conversion claim. 124 However, in elevating the semen specimens to
property-like status, the Hecht court found the decedent had an
ownership interest and retained "decision-making authority as to the
use of his sperm for reproduction" at the time of his death.125 Though
the court did not assess the validity of the decedent's will or the
contract concerning the disposition of the semen, the decision
provided that the specimens can be included in the estate and,
consequently, disposed of according to the decedent's intent. 126
Because stored semen specimens are a bequeathable part of the. _
decedent's estate, a form that disposes ofthis property and complies
with the signed, witnessed writing formalities should be given
effect. 127
119. ld. at 232.
120. ld. at 232-33.
121. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993);
Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 33, at 230, 233.
122. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
123. Moore v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480-81 (Cal. 1990).
124. ld. at 488-89.
125. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
126. See id. at 283-84.
127. See id. at 283; supra Part III.B.
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IV. MARYLAND'S STATUTE SHOULD CREATE A
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INHERITANCE BUT ALLOW
PCC TO INHERIT FROM THEIR FATHER'S ESTATE IF HE
SATISFIES FOUR REQUIREMENTS DURING HIS
LIFETIME.

A.

To Reconcile the Competing Interests a/the Legislature and
PCC, After-Born Heirs Should be Entitled to Inherit from Their
Deceased Parent in Certain Circumstances

To advance the legislative goal of streamlining the estate
administration process 128 while simultaneously effectuating the
decedent's intent, PCC should only be entitled to inherit from the
deceased parent's estate under limited circumstances. Maryland
should authorize this presumption against inheritance by statute,
declaring that PCC are not entitled to inherit from or through the
decedent's estate unless he (1) completed a signed, witnessed writing
at the time of the sperm donation, (2) consented to the posthumous
reproduction, (3) unequivocally indicated intent to financially provide
for that child, and (4) engaged in estate planning in order to create a
source for that child's inheritance. 129 By demarcating assets for the
after-born child's inheritance, the probate estate may be distributed
and wrapped up in a timely manner. 130
Such a strict inheritance statute would reconcile the competing
interests of the legislature and other heirs, who desire an efficient
estate administration process and protection of their inheritance,
respectively,131 while protecting the PCC and preserving their ability
to inherit. 132 Because the inheritance would be limited to funds set
aside for the purpose of providing for the after-born child and probate
assets would be off-limits, the personal representative could
distribute the probate estate according to the terms of the decedent's
will without interfering with the after-born's share. 133

128. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-105 (LexisNexis 2011).
129. See discussion infra Part IV.B-E; supra Part ILA.
130. See i'!fra Part IV.E.
131. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257,264-66 (Mass. 2002).
132. See supra Part lILA.
133. See i'!fra Part IV.E.
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A Written, Signed, and Witnessed Consent Form Completed at
the Time of the Donation Would Demonstrate the Donor's Intent
for the Specimens

Current law permits a donor to furnish only a signed writing in
order to comply with the statutory consent requirements. 134 However,
the formalities imposed upon testators executing their wills are
similarly necessary for men donating sperm as a contingency in the
event of their death. 135 Requiring a signed, witnessed writing serves
protective, ritual, evidentiary, and channeling functions. 136 Creating a
physical record of the donor's wishes ensures the decedent's intent
for the sperm specimens is known. 137 Additionally, the witnesses can
be called to testify if the disposition of the specimens is contested. 138
C.

For a Posthumously Conceived Child to Inherit from the
Deceased Father's Estate, the Donor Must Provide Written
Consent for the Posthumous Reproduction to Occur

Even if state law ultimately dictates the legal rights of after-born
heirs,139 a consent form completed at the time of the donation allows
the donor to make his intent regarding the ultimate disposition of the
semen specimens known. 140 By allowing the donor to specify his
intent for the specimens after his death, neither his family nor the
courts are forced to speculate. 141 These consent forms are analogous
to a transfer on death designation, creating a nonprobate arrangement
whereby the specimens pass according to the contract terms. 142

MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 3-107(b), 20-111(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
The written records are not required to be witnessed.ld. §§ 3-107, 20-III(c).
l35. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-102 (LexisNexis 2011).
l36. JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 225
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). Channeling refers to the use of standardized
formalities to ensure that the instrument passes "efficiently through the legal system."
ld. at 226.
l37. See id. at 226.
l38. See id.
l39. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
140. See Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 32.
141. See id. at 2-3; Semen Specimen Use and Release Authorization, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK,
2 (Aug. 17,2010), http://www.fairfaxcryobank.comlforms.shtml.
142. See VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 69; Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen
Depositor Agreement, supra note 32.
l34.
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Though spenu bank consent fonus vary in scope, most cover the
disposition of the specimens upon the donor's death. 143 Some fonus
require the donor to indicate whether the specimens should be
destroyed or released to a named individual. 144 Others establish
destruction of the specimens as the default, unless the donor provided
a signed, written, and notarized statement indicating his intent for a
child to be born posthumously and to transfer ownership of the
specimens to a designee. 145 One agreement requires the donor to list
the dates for which the cryopreservation agreement is effective; the
semen is disposed of beyond the specified date. 146 The Fertility
Center of California allows the donor to specify an individual, as well
as that person's successor, to receive and make all decisions related
to the specimen upon the donor's death. 147
Despite these variations amongst the fonus, the donor's intent
concerning posthumous reproduction will be ascertainable as long as
he completes a consent fonu that indicates whether the specimens
should be maintained for use by the designee or destroyed upon his
death. The fonus thus allow the donor to satisfy or fail the second
prong of the proposed statute at the time of the donation: the intent
element is met if he transfers ownership of the specimens to his
partner and consents to their use towards posthumous reproduction. 148
However, the donor fails to express the requisite intent for the
child's posthumous reproduction when he indicates that the
specimens should be destroyed, or if the consent fonu is silene 49 and

143. See, e.g., Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note
32, at 2-3; Sperm Cryopreservation and Storage Agreement, UNIVERSITY WOMEN'S

144.

HEALTHCARE-FERTILITY
CENTER,
http://www.university
womenshealthcare.comlinfertility/patients/sperm-cryopreservation-agreement.pdf
(last visited Dec. 11,2012).
See, e.g., Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note
32, at 2-3.

145. See, e.g., id.
146. Consent/Agreement for Cryopreservation and Storage of Semen, SPERM BANK OF
CALIFORNIA,
http://www.spermbankcalifomia.comlmediaiConsentAgreement-forCryopreservation-and-Storage-of-Semen I.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2012).
147. Ultimate Disposition of Semen Specimens, SPERM BANK OF CALIFORNIA,
http://spermbankcalifornia.comlmedialUltirnate-Disposition-of-SemenSpecimens l.pdf (last visited Dec. 11,2012).
148. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); e.g., Patient
Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 32, at 2-3; see
also Woodward v. Cornm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 269 (Mass. 2002).
149. See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269 (citing Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the
Dead: Challenges ofPosthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REv. 901, 951 (1997)).
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does not bequeath the specimens to a designated recipient. ISO
Consequently, the posthumously conceived child would be barred
from inheriting from the decedent's estate. 151
D.

To Ensure the Posthumously Conceived Child Is Eligiblefor
Inheritance Benefits, the Donor Must Unequivocally State His
Intent to Financially Provide for that Child

Under current Maryland law, the donor must consent to be the
parent of the posthumously conceived child; 152 however, the legal
implications of this requirement are ambiguous in light of the fact
that PCC are only conceived after the donor's death, never knowing
their father and without any chance of a traditional parent-child
relationship. In fact, consent forms generally contain a waiver
exempting the donor from legal obligations with respect to the
resulting child, and instead, the person who purchases the donated
sperm and conceives from the specimen becomes "solely responsible
for [the child's] support and custody.,,153 If a donor wants to ensure
his posthumously conceived child is provided for, he would need to
proactively indicate his desire to financially support the child. 154 For
example, some centers explicitly address posthumous reproduction in
their agreements:
A client may become a biological parent after his death ....
For a client to be recognized as the legal parent of a future
child, there must be a written and notarized statement signed
by the client during his lifetime stating he intends to parent
after his death and granting ownership of stored specimen to
a designee. Ownership of the specimens, with the authority
to control the use of the stored specimen will transfer to the
designee, according to the wishes expressed by the client
depositor. Ownership or use of the specimens after the
client depositor's death does not automatically grant legal
status to the child that the client depositor is the father.
150.
151.
152.
153.

154.

See, e.g., Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note
32; supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b)(2).
Terms
of
Use,
FAIRFAX
CRYOBANK,
2
(June
I,
2012),
http://www.fairfaxcryobank.comldocumentsIDISAOp.IOFFXTermsofUse_ WEB_DS.
pdf. The form states, "The donor has given up all of his rights and is released from
any obligations to children born using his sperm." Id.
See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269; Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen
Depositor Agreement, supra note 32.
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Without the client's written declaration of intent to parent,
the child would not be afforded legal rights of inheritance or
support. PRIOR TO USING THE SPECIMEN, PLEASE
CONSULT WITH AN EXPERIENCED ATTORNEY
REGARDING THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF INHERITANCE
OR SUPPORT OF A CHILD BORN AFTER THE
DEPOSITOR'S DEATH.155

This model consent fonn acknowledges the need for a fonnal,
written statement that expresses the donor's intent to father a child
posthumously and bequeaths the specimen to a designated
recipient. 156 However, the fonn defers the issue of the posthumously
conceived child's inheritance, thus exemplifying the need to clarify
this part of the law. 157
While the forms establish a default that removes the donor from
liability for the child, and therefore, create a sufficient waiver for
heterologous inseminations, donors in homologous inseminations can
draft around this standard language by unequivocally expressing the
intent to financially support the child. 158 The donor can accomplish
this at the time of the donation, and a consent fonn that complies with
the statutory fonnalities may confinn the donor's desire to provide
pecuniary support in addition to providing dispositive instructions for
the stored specimens. 159 Requiring the donor to consent in a written
record to provide financial support to the posthumously conceived
child adds precision to the current statutory language, which is
undefined and fails to explain the effect, if any, of consenting to be
the parent of the child. 160
155. Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 32, at 2
(emphasis added).
156. !d. In the case of homologous insemination using a stored embryo, the specimen
could automatically pass to the survivor upon the donor's death. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
SOC. SEC., supra note 95, at 37-38,56,85. This effectively gives nonprobate status to
the specimen so that upon the death of one owner, the property passes automatically
to the survivor by operation of law. See VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 18, 23.
However, this recommendation was specifically based on stored embryos, in which
both the man and the woman in the couple have a vested interest. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
Soc. SEC., supra note 95, at 37-38,56,85. The issue at bar is distinguishable because
when the stored specimen is limited to sperm, the woman does not yet have an
ownership interest in the gametic material. See id.
157. See Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen Depositor Agreement, supra note 32,
at 2.
158. See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269; Patient Form and Brochure Center, Semen
Depositor Agreement, supra note 32, at 2; Terms o/Use, supra note 153, at 1-2.
159. See discussion supra Part IV.A-C.
160. See MD. CODE ANN., EST & TRUSTS § 3-107(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
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Granting Inheritance Rights to PCC Will Only Be
Administratively Feasible if the Decedent Engaged in Estate
Planning During His Lifetime and Created a Source ofFunds for
the After-Born Child's Inheritance

Even if the donor meets the two-fold consent requirement, allowing
pee to inherit from the probate estate does not eliminate several
problems, such as: (1) determining the amount of assets to be
reserved for the child; (2) allowing the personal representative to
proceed with distributing the remainder of the estate; (3) protecting
the inheritance of the decedent's other children; or (4) guaranteeing
the posthumously conceived child will receive an inheritance at all if
born beyond the statute of limitations period. '61 These uncertainties
would be removed under the statute proposed by this comment if
Maryland requires the decedent to engage in estate planning during
his lifetime, such that the after-born heir would have an inheritance
reserved in the form of an inter vivos or testamentary truSt. 162 For
example, the donor could bequeath his residuary estate in trust to his
wife for life and then to his children. To further ensure that the
donor's intent is carried out with respect to supporting the after-born
child, the definitional section of the trust should expressly stipulate
that any reference to "child," "children," "descendant," or
"descendants," however expressed, shall be construed to include any
legitimate descendants, including a child or descendant conceived
after the donor's death. 163
Imposing a statutory requirement that any pee inherit from a
nonprobate source of assets also obviates the need to either amend
the statute of limitations pertaining to the closing of an estate,l64 or
impose a statute of limitations within which time the pee must be
born in order to inherit. 165 To maintain an efficient system where the
estate is wrapped up within a maximum timeframe, a statute of

161. See id. at § 3-107(B)(3); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS 1O-103(b){l) (LexisNexis
2011); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259; discussion supra Part lILA.
162. In Maryland, a trust established for the benefit of the unborn child would not violate
the rule against perpetuities as long as the trust document states that the rule against
perpetuities does not apply and the trustee has power to dispose of the property "for
any period of time beyond the period that is required for an interest ... to vest." EST.
& TRUSTS § 11-102(b)(5).
163. See VALLARIO, supra note 12, at 101-02.
164. See EST. & TRUSTS § 10-103(b)(1) (establishing a statute of limitations with respect to
closing estates).
165. See EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b)(3).

204

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

limitations should exist beyond which claims are barred. 166
Currently, the personal representative will be "discharged from any
claim or demand of any interested person" if the fiduciary is not
involved with any pending action one year after the estate is closed. 167
Claims regarding the improper distribution of property, however,
must be brought within three years of the decedent's death or one
year from the time of the distribution of property, whichever is
later. 168 The purpose of this law is the timely resolution of the estate,
prompt devolution of the property to the heirs, and the preservation of
assets for those children already alive and entitled to take under the
decedent's will or the laws of intestacy.169 Making the probate assets
off-limits in satisfying the after-born child's share would allow the
personal representative to proceed with administering the estate and
distributing assets to other beneficiaries without infringing on their
shares. 170
Some might argue this short time frame of three years should be
increased. 171 First, specimens can remain viable for upwards of ten
years.172 The surviving partner should not be pressured to conceive
immediately, especially while still mourning her partner's death.173
Alternatively, the woman may have difficulty conceiving and be
unable to become pregnant within the statute of limitations period. 174
The two-year period mandated in the current after-born heirs statute
fails to acknowledge these considerations. 175 But the problem of
keeping the estate open indefinitely in order to reserve assets for the
inheritance of an after-born child, who could be born upwards of ten
years after the decedent's death, becomes a non-issue if the
inheritance originates from a truSt. 176 Under the proposal set forth in
this comment, the current statute oflimitations can remain in force, 177
and the probate estate can be settled immediately without sacrificing
the after-born child's inheritance. It also preserves the protective
feature of the statute of limitations by preventing the existing
166. See EST. & TRUSTS §§ l-105(a), 10-103; Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 59 (4th Cir.
2011); In re Estate ofKolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
167. EST. & TRUSTS § 10-103(a)(I).
168. Id. at § 1O-103(b)(l).
169. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 59; In re Estate afKalacy, 753 A.2d at 1262.
170. In re Estate ofKalacy, 753 A.2d at 1262.
171. See EST. & TRUSTS § 1O-103(b)(1 )(i).
172. In re Estate ofKalaey, 753 A.2d at 1261.
173. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 268 (Mass. 2002).
174. Id.
175. See Mo. CooEANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
176. See In re Estate afKalacy, 753 A.2d at 1261-62.
177. Mo. CooEANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1O-103(b)(l)(LexisNexis 2011).
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children, either beneficiaries under the will or heirs under the laws of
intestacy, from receiving reduced benefits due to the subsequent
births of the PCc. 178 By statutorily requiring the donor to create an
estate plan that includes an inter vivos or testamentary trust, whether
the after-born child is entitled to inherit and whether a source for the
inheritance exists will be known at the donor's death. Further, since
the inheritance is reserved in trust, the current statute of limitations
can remain in effect, thereby ensuring the timely resolution of the
estate. 179
V. CONCLUSION
After losing their husbands to cancer, a heart attack, and leukemia,
respectively, Gayle Bums, Janice Schafer, and Patti Beeler all
conceived with the sperm their husbands banked prior to receiving
medical treatment. 180 For these women, and those like them who will
apply for and be denied social security benefits for their PCC in the
months and years ahead, state intestacy laws have become a
disastrous focal point of courts' decisions. 181
To keep pace with the advancements in reproductive technologies,
Maryland should further amend its current after-born heirs statute so
as not to preclude a growing class of children from receiving
inheritance benefits from their deceased fathers. 182 The amended law
should create a presumption against inheritance for children
conceived posthumously from their father's banked sperm. 183 In
order for PCC to be entitled to inherit as heirs of their father's
probate estate or as class members described in the will or trust of the
decedent or one of his relative's, the child's parent or guardian must
produce the decedent's signed, witnessed writing; a consent form
completed at the time of the donation would satisfy this statutory
requirement. 184 The writing must express the donor's unequivocal
intent for the posthumous reproduction to occur and the intent to
provide pecuniary support for the child. 185 This witnessed writing
178. See Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49,59 (4th Cir. 2011); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266.
179. See EST. & TRUSTS §§ 7-101, 1O-103(b)(1); supra notes 165-167 and accompanying
text.
180. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956-57; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Dobner, supra note
1.

181. SeesupraPartII.C.
182. See supra Part II.
183. See supra Part IV.A.
184. See supra Part IV.B.
185. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 269 (Mass. 2002); supra
Part IV.C-D.
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requirement will minimize fraudulent claims and prevent prolonged
proceedings whereby extrinsic evidence is needed to prove the
decedent's intent. 186 Lastly, the decedent must have engaged in estate
planning during his lifetime, creating a trust to protect the after-born
child's inheritance. 187 Without a source of funds reserved for the
posthumously conceived child, the child's right to inherit will be
void. 188 By prohibiting pee from accessing probate assets, the
personal representative can continue to administer the estate in a
timely manner, and the inheritance of the decedent's other heirs
remains protected. 189
Although this solution expands the inheritance rights of pee, the
restrictive nature of the proposed statute ensures that pee are not
receiving a financial windfall every time a widow chooses to have a
child using her deceased husband's banked semen. 190 Only when a
donor has taken calculated steps to ensure his after-born child is
financially supported will the child have a claim to an inheritance. 191
By avoiding a bright-line rule that either allows or denies inheritance
rights to pee, the competing interests of the legislature and donor are
reconciled. 192
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